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| Titre : | External police oversight agencies: emergence and consolidation (summary report) |
| Accompagne : | |
| Auteurs : | Laboratoire Pacte, Auteur ; Défenseur des droits, Auteur |
| Type de document : | Rapports et études |
| Année de publication : | 12/2022 |
| Format : | 22 p. |
| Langues: | Anglais |
| Mots-clés : |
[Mots-clés] Déontologie de la sécurité [Mots-clés] Professionnel de la sécurité [Mots-clés] Relation avec les professionnels de la sécurité [Mots-clés] Défenseur des droits [Mots-clés] Surveillance [Mots-clés] Comparatif [Mots-clés] Plainte [Mots-clés] Discrimination [Mots-clés] Violence [Mots-clés] Probité [Géographie] Europe |
| Mots-clés: | Agences de contrôle externe de la police ; Agence indépendante de régulation ; Droits de l'Homme ; Indépendance ; Dotation |
| Résumé : |
Based on original data collected in 20 countries, this research describes the variety of bodies that exist in Europe.It is found that Police Oversight Agencies (POAs) have been established in large numbers since the 1990s. The study reveals that the types of POAs are very different. They are public agencies that are not run by elected officials and have relative independence. All handle complaints and can make recommendations to the government. But very few have decision-making powers. More importantly, their ability to do so is conditioned by their independence and also by their resources. Thus, for example, the study shows that the number of complaints received is proportional to the resources available to POAs.
A typological analysis reveals two categories of POAs by combining two criteria, the degree of formal independence and financial resources : the "weakly independent-resource-rich" on the one hand, and the "independent-resource-poor"on the other hand. Thus, we highlight that governments that guarantee the independence of POAs give them less material means to carry out their mission. This is particularly the case in France, which has the lowest resources in Europe per police officer in its jurisdiction. Conversely, the Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland has the largest resources per officer, but less formal independence. |
| Note de contenu : |
Summary
Foreword Introduction 1. The normative shift towards the delegation of police oversight 2. Method 3. Results: the diversity of agencies 4. Results: what explanations for the diversity of the POAs? 5. Perspectives: Measuring the effects of POAs on police behaviour 6. Conclusion |
| Thématique Bulletin documentaire PDF : | Relation avec les professionnels de la sécurité |
Documents numériques (1)
 DDD_ETU_202212_POLDEM-SYNTH-EN.pdf Adobe Acrobat PDF |
